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DOES A CORPORATION REALIZE GAIN OR LOSS ON A
LIQUIDATING DISTRIBUTION IN KIND?
By

CHARLES S. CORK*

N VIEW of the thousands of corporations which have been liquidated over the last three decades, it is surprising that there should
have been so little judicial consideration and analysis of whether a
corporation realizes gain or loss recognizable for Federal income tax
purposes on the distribution of its property in partial or complete
liquidation.
No doubt this is due to the fact that the Treasury Department regulations since 1918 have contained a provision similar to the following
sentence quoted from Regulations i ii, Section 29.22 (a) -20:
"No gain or loss is realized by a corporation from the mere
distribution of its assets in kind in partial or complete liquidation,
however they may have appreciated or depreciated in value since
their acquisition."'
The frequency of such liquidations, invariably involving substantial
amounts of tax, prompts this discussion of the validity of the quoted
rule as an interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, particularly
Section 22 (a), and its judicial acceptance in the light of ever-changing views as to the binding effect of administrative interpretation of
substantive law.
Perhaps because the rule could work in the interests of the Government where the corporate assets have decreased in value since acquisition, thus appearing on its face to be a give and take proposition, "the
administrative mind, represented by the Commissioner and his lawyers," has not been "bent on whittling it away" 2 with that same determination devoted to the often successful attacks upon other regulations. Whether for this reason or not, the Commissioner's principal
efforts to tax appreciation in value of corporate property on liquida*Member of the Macon, Georgia, Bar.
1. See Article 547 of Regulations 45 (1918); Article 548 of Regulations 62 (1921), Regulations 65
(1924). and Regulations 69 (1926); Article 71 of Regulations 74 (1928) and Regulations 77
(1932); Section 22(a)-21 of Regulations 86 (1934), Regulations 94 (1936), Regulations 101
(1938), and Regulations 103 (the first regulations under the Internal Revenue Code). The
words "in dissolution" were used in Regulations 69 and earlier regulations where the words "in
partial or complete liquidation" appears in all subsequent regulations, including present Regulations 111.
2. The quoted words are Judge Sibley's in F.H.E. Oil Company v. Commissioner, 147 F. 2d 1002,
1003 (C.C.A. 5th 1945). The Court was discussing the attack upon the option (which, in Judge
Sibley's words, "The legislative mind of the Treasury Department seems determined to maintain.") given in regulations since 1918 to deduct as expense or to capitalize drilling and development costs of oil wells.
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tion have been exercised in cases, such as Commissioner v. Court Holding Company' and Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Commissioner,4 where
he contended that what appeared to be a sale by stockholders shortly
after liquidation was in substance a sale by the corporation, or cases
such as Taylor Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner,' Hellebush v. Com7 where
missioner,6 and Fairfield Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner,
he urged that sales shortly after liquidation were by agents or trustees
acting for the corporation in dissolution rather than by agents or
trustees representing the stockholders. As a result, corporate taxpayers have seldom been forced to defend the validity of the rule under
discussion. In no case does the Commissioner appear to have attacked
it in an appellate court.
Conversely, corporate taxpayers have seldom pressed to the point
of litigation the deduction of losses due to depreciation in value of
assets distributed in liquidation. A sale of such assets prior to liquidation would usually accomplish the purpose of establishing a loss by the
corporation. Accordingly, if the assets of the corporation are in
any event to be sold to non-stockholders, it is within the power of the
stockholders to cause their sale by the corporation before, or by themselves after, liquidation. For this reason it seems, instead of the rule's
operating evenly as between the Treasury and the taxpayers, it would
in the long run favor the latter.
For whatever reason, the validity of this rule has been the subject
of infrequent frontal attack, all of which seem to have been more or
less half-hearted. Certainly the reported decisions exhibit no thorough
inquiry into the basic underlying considerations. Above the level of
the United States Tax Court, no opinion discusses the correctness of
the rule. The Tax Court (and its predecessor Board of Tax Appeals)
has, in the majority of its opinions dealing with the subject, merely
assumed the correctness of the rule without analysis.
It would be profitless to analyse and discuss the many appellate
decisions where the rule was recognized or necessarily involved.
Those cases which hold that the property in question was sold by
or for the corporation and was not, for tax purposes, distributed to
the stockholders, clearly do not, in the absence of express rulings by
the courts, indicate approval or disapproval of the rule. Thus the
3. 324 U. S. 331, 65 S. Ct. 707, 89 L. Ed. 981 (1945).

4. 144 F. 2d 282 (C.C.A. 3rd 1944).
5. 47 F. 2d 108 (C.C.A. 5th 1931).

6. 65 F. 2d 902 (C.C.A. 6th 1933).
7. 157 F. 2d 321 (C.C.A. 2d 1946) cert. denied 329 U. S. 774, 67 S. Ct. 193, 91 L. Ed. 665 (1946).
8. An illustration of failure to accomplish the purpose is Gaunt & Harris v. United States, 110
F. 2d 651 (C.C.A. 6th 1940). A sale in 1932 to controlling stockholders, apparently after decision to dissolve, was held to be a distribution in liquidation which did not result in loss to the
corporation. In 1932, there was no provision corresponding to I.R.C. Section 24(b) which prohibits the deduction of losses from sales and exchanges between parties occupying certain special
relationships such as that of a corporation and an individual owning, directly or indirectly, more
than fifty per centum in value of its outstanding stock.
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mere fact that it is stated in footnote 3 to the opinion in Commissioner
v. Court Holding Company that Treasury Regulations "have long
provided... that a corporation realizes no taxable gain by a mere distribution of its assets in kind, in partial or in complete liquidation" 9
can hardly be taken to indicate what the court would hold if the
validity of the regulation were in issue. The same must be said of
such cases as Gaunt & Harris v. United States," where neither the
appellate nor the district court" referred to the regulation, but held
the corporation taxable.
On the other hand, those cases which hold there was a liquidation
followed by a sale by the stockholders 2 or by someone acting on
their behalf", seem, by necessary implication, to uphold the principle
that no gain is realized by the distribution in liquidation, at least
where the liquidation and sale occur during the same taxable year of
the corporation. However, where the truth of a proposition is conceded by the party who alone would gain by its denial the courts
seldom go behind the concession to see if it is in fact justified." In
none of the appellate decisions so holding do we find our question
raised or discussed, so that it would seem they afford little comfort
beyond that afforded by the regulations itself.
Indeed, we find one case, Fairfield Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner,1" where the court held that a transfer by a subsidiary in liquidation to its parent corporation resulted in gain to the subsidiary because the transaction was not within I.R.C. Section 1 12(b) (6) providing for non-recognition of gain or loss to a corporation receiving
property distributed on complete liquidation of another. Of course
this basis for the decision was unsound because Section I 12(b) (6) is
applicable only to gain or loss of the parent and not of the subsidiary,
as was recognized by Judge L. Hand in an addendum to the opinion
placing it on the ground that the parent occupied the position of
trustee or receiver in dissolution of the subsidiary at the time the
parent sold the asset received in liquidation. But it shows that Judge
Hand must have instinctively felt that gain was realized by the subsidiary on the liquidation, taxable unless covered by a non-recognition
provision of the law.
9. 324 U. S. at 332, 65 S. Ct. at 707, 89 L. Ed. at 984 (1944).
10. Supra, note 8. The case is cited as supporting the rule by 1 RABKIN AND JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION,

1312.

11. 23 A.F.T.R. 1141 (D. C. Ky. 1938).
12. For example, Cumberland Public Service Co. v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 843 (Ct. Cl. 1949);
Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 319 (C.C.A. 5th 1947); Cf. Kaufmann v.
Commissioner, 174 F. 2d ............ (C.C.A. 3rd 1949).
13. United States v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 166 F. 2d 17 (C.C.A. 6th 1948).
14. Compare the following quotation from F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F. 2d 1002, 1003
(C.C.A. 5th 1945): "The question of its validity has seldom been raised, the taxpayers not
wishing to attack it because it favors them, and the Commissioner not being in position to
repudiate the regulation of his own department. The judges have not thought it their business
to raise the question: but if the Option be in truth contrary to the revenue statutes, it is void,
and it is the duty of the judges to declare and uphold the law, and disregard the regulation."
15. 157 F. 2d 321 (C.C.A. 2d 1946) cert. denied 329 U. S. 774, 67 S. Ct. 193, 91 L. Ed. 665 (1946).
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Nothing need be said of the many "whodunit" cases decided by
the Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court and nothing will be
gained by discussing their decisions which merely state the rule or
cite the regulation. 6
This brings us to the few cases which have gone beyond reliance
upon the regulation itself. They will be critically discussed in their
chronological order.
Stock Yards Bank of Cincinnati."
Petitioner's stockholders sold their stock to a competitor bank who
then took over petitioner's assets in complete liquidation of its affairs,
this occurring in 1926. In overruling the Commissioner's determination that petitioner realized a gain, the Board referred to Section
201 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 as providing in part that
"Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation shall
be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock" and that "the
gain or loss to the distributee resulting from such exchange shall be
determined under Section 202 . . . ." The Board refused to apply
this Section to the petitioner, stating: "We are not concerned here
with the gain or loss, if any, to the distributee resulting from such
complete liquidation, or with the gain or loss realized to the old stockholders of petitioner upon the sale of their stock to the nominee of
the Trust Company. We are only concerned now with the question
whether petitioner realized a gain or loss when it distributed its
assets, etc., to its sole stockholder in complete liquidation of its affairs.
We believe that the respondent has correctly answered this question in
Article 548 of his Regulations 69," providing that no gain or loss is
realized by a corporation from the mere distribution of its assets in
kind upon dissolution.
This is the first and apparently the only time the statute corresponding to Section 201 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 has been discussed
in a published decision as having any possible bearing on the question under consideration. The Court summarily dismissed it as dealing only with the liability of the distributee in spite of the unqualified
language requiring amounts distributed to be treated as full payment
"in exchange for the stock." There is nothing in this language to indicate it should be so treated only from the standpoint of the distributee.
The mere fact that a subsequent sentence provides how the distributee's gain or loss should be determined would not seem to pre16. Among the latter are Chicago Binder & File Co., 4 B.T.A. 1002 (1926); Coeby-Wirth Sales Book
Co., 19 B.T.A. 1074 (1930) (Acq. IX-2 CB 13); J.T.S. Brown's Son Co., 10 T.C. 840 (1948)
(Aeq. 1948-2 CB 1).
11. 25 B.T.A. 964 (1932) (Acq. XI-2 CB 9).
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vent the requirement that the distribution be treated as a payment in
exchange for the stock from being applicable to the corporation. 8
Admittedly some support may be gained for the view that Congress had in mind only the tax treatment of the distributee from a
consideration of the legislative history of the section of the Revenue
Acts corresponding to Section 201 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926."9
Section 201(c) of the 1918 Act contained the following sentence:
"Amounts distributed in the liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as payments in exchange for stock or shares, and any gain or profit
realized thereby shall be taxed to the distributee as other gains or
profits." Under this Act the Treasury ruled that liquidating dividends
did not enjoy the exemption from normal tax then granted ordinary
dividends. No corresponding sentence was contained in the 1921
Act, 1 which had for the first time, in Section 2o6, introduced the concept of capital gains and losses and provided a limitation on their
taxability. The House Ways and Means Committee report on the
Revenue Bill of 19242 and the Senate Finance Committee Report 3
stated that "the Treasury has construed the existing law as taxing
liquidating dividends, not as capital gains, but as dividends subject to
the surtax rates." The Congress thought such dividends should be
treated as capital gains to the distributees and apparently had only
this end in mind in enacting Section 2o (c) into law. However, the
following significant language, which seems applicable as well to the
corporation as to the stockholder, is used in the Ways and Means
Committee report:
"The proposed bill, as did the 1918 Act, treats a liquidating
dividend as a sale of the stock to the corporation and recognizes
the true effect of such a distribution." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Senate Finance Committee Report also contains the following
significant statement:
"A liquidating dividend is, in effect, a sale by the stockholder
18. Compare the following language in Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner. 328 U. S. 25, 27, 66
S. Ct. 861, 863, 90 L. Ed. 1062. 1064 (1946): "A decision on the category of expenditures to
which these 50% disbursements belong affects both the operators who make them and the
owners, lessors, vendors. grantors, however they may be classed, who receive them. If they
are capital investments to one, they are capital sales to the other. If they are rents or royalties
paid out to one, they are rents or royalties received by the other."
19. There was no corresponding provision in the 1921 and 1934 Acts or in Acts prior to 1918. The
corresponding section was numbered 201(c) in the 1918, 1924 and 1926 Acts. Beginning with the
1928 Act the corresponding provision has been Section 115(c). The pertinent portion of present
I.R.C. Section 115(c) reads as follows: "Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock, and amounts distributed
in partial liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in part or full payment in exchange
for the stock. The gain or loss to the distributee resulting from such exchange shall be determined under Section 111, but shall be recognized only to the extent provided in Section 112."
20. Regulations 45. Article 1548. The ruling was upheld in Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U. S. 233, 48
S. Ct. 244, 72 L. Ed. 544 (1928).
21. The omission was held to bring liquidating dividends under Section 201(a), along with ordinary
dividends, and to exempt them from normal tax. Frank D. Darrow, 8 B.T.A. 276 (1927)
(Acq.
VII-1 CB 8). "
22. CB 1939-1 (part 2), page 249.
23. CB 1939-1 (part 2). page 274.
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of his stock to the corporation; he surrenders his interest in the
corporation and receives money in place thereof."
If such is the "true effect" of a distribution in liquidation,24 and
no reason to the contrary has suggested itself to the author,25 then is
it necessary for the Congress specifically to provide for the tax treatment of the corporation or would not the corporation be taxable under
the broad sweep of Section 22 (a) ?26 Where a corporation purchases
its stock with property it has long been held that it realizes gain or
loss. 7 What is the difference between, on the one hand, a purchase of
stock with assets and, on the other hand, a distribution of assets in
partial or complete liquidation if the "true effect" of a liquidating
dividend is the sale of the stock to the corporation, or conversely the
purchase of its stock by the corporation?
In its consideration of Stock Yards Bank of Cincinnati, the Board
did not have before it, or available, further legislative history of any
significance in this connection and it might be well to conclude the
discussion of this case at this point. On the other hand, it seems more
orderly here to present the subsequent legislative history for such
light as it throws upon the correctness of the Board's decision that
Section 2oi (c) has no application to the corporation.
The treatment of distributions in liquidation as payments in exchange for stock was continued in the Revenue Acts from 1924
through the 1932 Act. In the 1934 Act this treatment was discontinued, the following reason being assigned by both the House and
Senate Committees:"8 "Under existing law a distribution in liquidation of a corporation is treated in the same manner as a sale of stock.
This rule has serious objections, as it permits wealthy stockholders
to escape surtax upon corporate earnings or profits distributed in the
form of liquidating dividends . . . Your committee recognizes that
liquidating dividends do contain some of the elements of a sale in
that the shareholder is relinquishing in whole or in part his invest24. Compare the following language (quoted approvingly in Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U. S. at 235,
48 S. Ct. at 245, 72 L. Ed. at 546) of Regulations 45, Article 1548: "So-called liquidation or dissolution dividends . . . are to be regarded as payments for the stock of the dissolved corporation.
A distribution in liquidation of the assets and business of a corporation, which is a return
to the stockholder of the value of his stock upon a surrender of his interest in the corporation,
is distinguishable from a dividend paid by a going corporation out of current earnings or accumulated surplus when declared by the directors in their discretion, which is in the nature of a
recurrent return upon the stock."
25. See 16 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATION 871-3 (1942) and 19 C.J.S. Section 1693 (1940), keeping in mind the distinction between complete liquidation and dissolution before complete liquidation.
26. Compare Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed. 788 (1940) holding failure
of the Congress to make provision for short term trusts in Section 166, which deals specifically
with trusts whose income is taxable to the settlor, though urged to do so by the Treasury, "cannot be said to have subtracted from Section 22(a) what was already there."
27. Commissioner v. Boca Ceiga Development Co.. 66 F. 2d 1004 (C.C.A. 3rd 1933); Commissioner
v. S. A. Woods Mach. Co., 57 F. 2d 635 (C.C.A. 1st 1932); Allyne-Zerk Co. v. Commissioner, 83
F. 2d 525 (C.C.A. 6th 1936); Hammond Iron Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F. 2d 4 (C.C.A. 5th
1941). The vacillation of the Board of Tax Appeals on the question, pointed out in the Boca
Ceiga and Hammond cases, was ended in Trinity Corporatiop, 44 B.T.A. 1219 (1941), affirmed
127 F. 2d 604 (C.C.A. 5th 1942).
28. CB 1939-1 (part 2), pages 576-614.
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ment in the corporation. On the other hand, they also contain some of
the elements of an ordinary dividend insofar as they represent a
distribution of corporate earnings or profits."
In the Revenue Act of 1936 complete liquidations coming within a
specified definition were again treated as payments in exchange for
stock. The Ways and Means Committee said, with reference to this
change: "The present rule which requires the taxpayer in such a case
to be taxed on IOO% of the gain is preventing liquidation of many
corporations. Thus, we are getting very little tax under the strict
rule now provided. It is believed that the result of this modification
in the method of taxing gains arising from complete liquidation will
bring about a substantial increase in the revenue. In the opinion of
change will result in about $4o,ooo,ooo.oo in adyour committee that
29
ditional revenue.
In 1942, Section 115 (c) was amended to afford distributions in
partial liquidation the same treatment as distributions in complete
liquidation. The Committee reports indicate that both the House and
Senate were concerned only with the inequity between complete and
partial liquidations and point out that proper application of Section
115 (g) will prove adequate to prevent taxable dividends disguised
as partial liquidations from receiving capital gain treatment." It is
obvious that the Congress was thinking only of the tax treatment of
the distributee.
The first express recognition we find on the part of either house of
the Congress of the fact that a corporation is not taxed on distributions in liquidation appears in the House Ways and Means Committee report dealing with Section 129 of H.R. 6712 which was submitted to the 8oth Congress." It thus appears that the House of Representatives, at least, recognizes that neither Section i i (c) nor
any other provision of the Internal Revenue Code has been interpreted as permitting the recognition of gain or loss to a corporation on
liquidating distributions and that the House approves of this treatment of such distributions. Dealing with Section 129 of the bill, the
Committee report said:
"Under existing law it has been held that (where) a corporation is liquidated by distributing its assets to its stockholders, no
tax is imposed on the corporation on any appreciation in the
value of the assets over their adjusted basis (or cost) to the corporation. As far as the stockholders are concerned, any excess
29. CB 1939-1 (part 2), page 674.
30. See comment of House Ways and Means Committee on Section 133 of H.R. 7378 (77th Congress) and of the Senate Finance Committee on Section 149 of the Bill as submitted to the

Senate.
31. The bill (commonly known as the Revenue Revision Bill of 1948) passed the House but was not
acted upon by the Senate. A similar bill is now pending before the 81st Congress as H.R. 990.
The question dealt with in this article would be foreclosed by the enactment of this section.
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of the value of such assets over the cost or other basis of the stock
is taxed as capital gains.
"On the other hand, if the corporation sells its assets just prior
to-liquidation, a tax is imposed on the corporation, and when
the proceeds are distributed to the stockholders another tax may
be imposed on them. In a great many cases disputes have arisen
between the Government and the taxpayer as to whether a sale
was made by a corporation or its shareholders. The problem went
to the Supreme Court in the Court Holding Company case (324
U. S. 331 (I945)).
"The two methods of liquidation are essentially the same, and
your committee believes there is no justification for subjecting the
second method to discriminatory tax treatment, particularly since
this method represents, in most cases, the more efficient form of
liquidation. Moreover, there often is considerable uncertainty as
to whether the sale of the assets was effected by the corporation
before liquidation or by the stockholders after the distribution.
As a result there has been much litigation."
Summarizing this legislative history, it would seem that the Board
was correct in deciding that Section 201 (c) of the Revenue Act of
1926 was not intended to apply to the corporation in liquidation, but
that in its enactment the Congress was concerned only with the tax
effect upon the distributee; however, there is nothing in the legislative
history prior to 1948 which indicates Congressional approval of the
regulation under consideration or to indicate its awareness of the
problem at all. In view of what the Ways and Means Committee so
clearly stated to be the "true effect" of a liquidation in its report on
the Revenue Act of 1924, it is highly debatable whether the Board
was correct in ruling that the corporation was not taxable simply'because Section 201 (c) was not enacted for the purpose of making it
taxable.
Dill Manufacturing Company."
The case arose under the 1932 Act. Because of dissension between
its majority and minority stockholders, petitioner acquired the stockholdings of the latter, immediately retiring the stock and reducing
the stated capital. As part of the consideration for the stock, petitioner transferred United States Bonds which had decreased in value and
sought to deduct the amount of the decrease as a loss. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and was upheld by the Board.
In addition to citing the case of Stock Yards Bank of Cincinnati,
supra, as well as several other cases which throw no light on the
32. 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939)

(Non-acq.

1939-2 CB 47).
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question under consideration, the Board cited as authority General
Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering.3" This decision involved a
dividend in kind, unaccompanied by any surrender of stock to the
corporation. It cannot therefore be authority for the proposition
that a partial or complete liquidation, in which property is exchanged
for stock, involves no gain or loss to the corporation. As a matter
of fact, the Supreme Court based its decision on the following terse
statement: "This was no sale; assets were not used to discharge indebtedness." The main burden of the argument in the lower courts
involved whether a cash dividend had been declared creating an indebtedness on the part of the corporation which was satisfied by the
dividend in kind. No consideration was given to whether taxable income is realized by a corporation which exchanges assets for its stock. 4
The Board also relied upon Hellebush v. Commissioner 5 which
had upheld the validity of Article 71 of Regulations 77. The Court
in the Hellebush case was dealing, however, with that portion of
Article 71 providing that sales of property by trustees in dissolution
be treated as if made by the corporation. Finding the sale to be by
such trustees, the Court held the corporation taxable. The Sixth
Circuit Court was therefore not passing directly upon that portion
of the regulation dealing with distributions in liquidation. However
the Court quoted the entire regulation and said that due to repeated
re-enactment of Section 2 13 (a)," the regulation having been in force
as an interpretation of this Section since 1918, without change by the
Congress, the regulation "should now be given effect." 3 If this principle cannot be disputed, clearly our search is at an end-we now have
thirty years of re-enactment instead of fifteen at the time of Hellebush. The principle can best be examined in connection with the next
Board decision.
8
Lencard Corporation."
Petitioner had outstanding preferred shares redeemable upon
notice at $Ioo per share, all owned by one shareholder. The common
stock was owned by different shareholders. The preferred stock was
redeemed by delivering to the preferred shareholder stock of other
corporations, the fair market value of which, together with a small
33. 296 U. S. 200, 56 S. Ct. 185, 80 L. Ed. 154 (1935).
34. Even as to what was actually decided in the General Utilities case, it is stated in 1 MERTENS,
), that authority exists holding it still an open
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 515 (.
question. See also Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F. 2d 1004 (C.C.A. 5th
1948). reversing 8 T.C. 831 (1947), and holding a corporation taxable on collections by its
stockholders on notes distributed as a dividend in kind after having been previously charged off.
35. 65 F. 2d 902 (C.C.A. 6th 1933).
36. Corresponding to present Section 22(a).
37. To the same effect is First National Bank of Greely v. United States, 86 F. 2d 938 (C.C.A. 10th
1936). Also holding a corporation taxable on sales by its trustee in dissolution, the Court
recognized that repeated re-enactment of a statute would not validate a regulation clearly inconsistent with it.
38. 47 B.T.A. 58 (1942) (Acq. 1942-2 CB 12).
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amount of cash, equalled the redemption price of the preferred. This
was then retired and cancelled and the certificate of incorporation was
amended to eliminate the preferred stock from the capitalization.
The value of the stock delivered to the preferred shareholder exceeded- its basis, no gain was reported by petitioner, and the Commissioner determined deficiencies by including the appreciation in
value as part of petitioner's gross income.
The Board stated that if the transaction was in essence the sale of
petitioner's assets in consideration of its own shares, a gain was
realized, but that if the transaction was essentially the liquidation of
petitioner's outstanding stock, it realized no gain, citing for the latter
proposition the regulation, Meurer Steel Barrel Co.," and Dill Manufacturing Co., just discussed herein.
Concluding that the transaction was essentially one in liquidation,
the Board proceeded to say: "Article 22(a)-2I of Regulations 86,
cited above, provides that: ...No gain or loss is realized by a corporation from the mere distribution of its assets in kind in partial or
complete liquidation, however they may have appreciated or depreciated in value since their acquisition . ..This regulation has appeared in all regulations since Regulation 74 (1928 Act). It has been
carried forth in regulation applicable to the Revenue Acts of 1928,
1932, 1934, 1936, and 1938. As stated by the Supreme Court in
Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 3o6 U. S. IIo,115, 'Congress
must be taken to have approved the administrative construction and
thereby to have given it the force of law'."
Here again we have the same reasoning as that used in Dill Manufacturing Co. in relying upon Hellebush v. Commissioner." The fact
that the authority here cited is our highest court, and a more recent
pronouncement, 4' prompts the discussion at this point as to whether
we can now rely with assurance upon Congressional failure to deal
specifically with the regulation in re-enacting Section 22(a) of the
Code and corresponding provisions of prior Revenue Acts. Has the
Congress "given it the force of law"?
Only a year earlier, the Supreme Court has said, in Biddle v. Commissioner :42
"Where the law is plain the subsequent re-enactment of a
39. 11 B.T.A. 684 (1928), affirmed per curam without opinion, 35 F. 2d 1019 (C.C.A. 2d 1929).
The Board did not discuss the correctness of the principle under consideration, but assumed that
a corporation would sustain no loss on a distribution in liquidation, denying the deduction taken
by the corporation for a claimed loss. The Board discussed only whether there was a sale or a
distribution in liquidation.
40. 65 F. 2d 902 (C.C.A. 6th 1933).
41. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110, 59 S. Ct. 423, 83 L. Ed. 536 (1939).
42. 302 U. S. 573, 582, 58 S. Ct. 379, 383, 82 L. Ed. 431, 439 (1938). In the quoted phrase the Court
was treating "administrative construction" as though it had the force of a regulation, stating
that it was "Laying aside the fact that departmental rulings not promulgated by the Secretary
are of little aid in interpreting a tax statute . . ."
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statute does not constitute adoption of its administrative construction."
Less than a year later the Supreme Court was saying, in Helvering
v. WVilshire Oil Co.: "The oft-repeated statement that administrative construction receives legislative approval by re-enactment of a
statutory provision, without material change (United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., supra) covers the situation where the validity
of administrative action standing by itself may be dubious or where
ambiguities in a statute or rules are resolved by reference to administrative practice prior to re-enactment of a statute; and where it
does not appear that the rule or practice has been changed by the
administrative agency through exercise of its continuing rule-making
power. It does not mean that a regulation interpreting a provision of
one act becomes frozen into another act merely by re-enactment of
that provision, so that that administrative interpretation cannot be
changed prospectively through exercise of appropriate rule-making
powers."
And at the next term of court, it was saying, in Helvering v. Reyn-

olds : "That rule is no more than an aid in statutory construction.
While it is useful at times in resolving statutory ambiguities, it does
not mean that the prior construction has become so embedded in the
law that only Congress can effect a change. (Citations.) It gives way
before changes in the prior rule or practice through exercise by the
administrative agency of its continuing rule-making power."
No useful purpose would be served by undertaking to reconcile or
to review further the cases on this point in order to determine under
what circumstances the various and inconsistent statements of the
effect of re-enactment will be applied.45 No safe conclusion can be
drawn even as applied to the regulation under consideration. It seems
a fair inference, however, that unless and until Helvering v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. is overruled," it will be cited against recognition of gain or loss to a corporation on the distribution of its assets
in kind in liquidation, and will be followed unless the Courts consider the regulation to be clearly erroneous under Section 22(a) or
Section 115 (c).
No further points are brought out in other Board or Tax Court
43. 308 U. S. 90, 60 S. Ct. 18, 84 L. Ed. 101 (1939).
44. 313 U. S. 428, 61 S. Ct. 971, 85 L. Ed. 1438 (1941).
45. The cases cited in notes 40-43 inclusive, and others, are discussed in footnotes 46 and 47 to
tne opinion in Helvering v. Griffitns. 318 U. S. 371. 395, 63 S. Ct. 636. 649, 87 L. Ed. 843, 859
(1943), in Busey v. Deshler Hotel Co., 130 F. 2d 187 (C.C.A. 6th 1942), and in other cases too
numerous to mention. See 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 91 et seq., where it is
concluded that the merits of the case should be the determining factor with rules of construction
serving merely as aids.
46. The principle quoted by the Board has been restated and followed in the more recent cases of
United States v. Seattle First National Bank, 321 U. S. 583, 64 S. Ct. 713, 88 L. Ed. 944 (1944).
and Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 1047, 91 L. Ed. 1301 (1947).
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decisions on the subject and it is necessary further to say concerning
them only that they reveal a disposition on the part of the Commissioner to attack the regulation in the Tax Court, where its validity
seems to be settled, at frequent intervals without the determination to
appeal the issue to the courts. Thus, after losing Stock Yards Bank
of Cincinnati, he acquiesced in the result. He maintained the validity
of the regulation in Dill Manufacturing Company and prevailed on
this issue. In Lencard Corporation he again attacked the regulation,
47 he again
lost, and acquiesced in the result. In Ramon Corporation
attacked it unsuccessfully. His latest acquiescence in J. T. S. Brown's
Son Co.," is therefore little assurance that he will not again litigate
the issue or use the threat of litigation as a lever to promote settlement of some other issue or to exact a tax which his regulation does
not authorize.

Conclusion
Administrative considerations are perhaps preponderantly in support of the regulation. In those cases where liquidation is not followed
by a sale of the corporate assets questions of valuation would be involved to determine whether the assets had appreciated or depreciated relative to their basis. The method of determining gain or loss
might itself present a problem-for instance, would the assets be
valued, or would their basis be compared with the fair value of the
stock surrendered on the date of liquidation," which itself might be
affected by the fact of liquidation and might differ greatly from the
fair value of the assets?
Certainly a different rule would prevent many liquidations desirable from the standpoint of the economical continuance of the business, whether by the same or different owners, a result which the
Congress sought to avoid in 1936 when it again permitted the shareholders to treat their gains as capital gains.
Neither of these considerations would go far in court if the law
were clearly contrary, nor would the fact of double taxation on the
corporation and its stockholders or the hardship involved in imposing
a tax at the very moment of extinction of the corporate life. Both
of these incidents were involved in all the cases similar to Commis47. Prentice-Hall Memo Decisions, Paragraph 47, 179 (1947).
48. 10 T.C. 840 (1948) (Acq. 1948-2 CB 1).
49. Compare Ida I. McKinney, 32 B.T.A. 450 (1935).
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sioner v. Court Holding Company." Such appeals would be better
addressed to the Congress than to the courts."
In a setting framed by these considerations, however, the long
existence of the regulation, the re-enactment since 1918 of Section
22 (a) without modification on account of the regulation," and the
legislative history of Section iiS(c), present a very strong case for
applying the doctrine of Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company" against any contention that Section 22 (a) calls for taxation
and for treating Section 115 (c) as inapplicable.
50. 324 U. S. 331, 65 S. Ct. 707, 89 L. Ed. 981 (1945). See Helvering v. Enright's Estate, 312 U. S.
636, 61 S. Ct. 777, 85 L. Ed. 1093 (1941), and Pfaff v. Commissioner, 312 U. S. 646, 61 S. Ct.
783. 85 L. Ed. 1099 (1941), requiring the accrual as income in the final return of a decedent who
reported on the cash basis of items of income which a living taxpayer reporting on the accrual basis would not be required to accrue. The hardship occasioned by this rule prompted the
enactment of Section 134 (e) of the Revenue Act of 1942. See I.R.C. Section 126.
51. The question would be settled by the enactment of a provision similar to Section 129 of the
Revenue Revision Act of 1948, as submitted to the House.
52. See the opinion denying the first motion for rehearing in F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 149
F. 2d 238 (C.C.A. 5th 1945). The original opinion (147 F. 2d 1002 C.C.A. 5th (1945)) had broadly
held invalid the long continued regulation making it optional with the taxpayer to expense or
to capitalize drilling and development costs of oil wells. On rehearing the Court withdrew this
basis of its decision, saying: "While we see no fault in our previous reasoning, and think the
former opinion a right one to have been rendered twenty years ago, we find it unnecessary to
consider so broadly the validity of the option, and now confine our decision 'to the applicability
of the regulation to the facts of the particular case'." A second opinion on rehearing is reported
in 150 F. 2d 857 (C.C.A. 5th 1945).
53. 306 U. S. 110, 59 S. Ct. 423, 83 L. Ed. 536 (1939).
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